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Abstract
Former  clandestine  militants’ voices  and  stories  have  been  recurrently  silenced  in  the
Portuguese “battle over memory”, because their activities were linked to events, such as the
Revolution of 25 April 1974, which have themselves been politically and socially depreciated
in mainstream political narratives. Only recently did the traditional political narratives start to
be questioned and debated by Portuguese scholars. Such political narratives took root in the
country  in  the  decades  that  followed  the  April  Revolution,  with  various  scholars  and
politicians denying the fascist categorisation of  Estado Novo and adopting an authoritarian,
non-totalitarian and non-fascist  perspective,  while  recurrently depicting the Revolution as
highly negative (namely as the source of the economic troubles of the country). Thus, for a
long time, Portuguese conservatives opted to avoid debates on the 48 years of the  Estado
Novo’s regime which, among other things, maintained a very repressive and violent political
police force, a camp of forced labour in Cape Vert known as Tarrafal, and a Colonial War on
three African fronts. This article examines the existent academic publications which counter
such oblivion of memory regarding armed struggle in Portugal. It also explores the reasons
behind, on the one hand, the whitewashing of  Estado Novo and the historical revisionism
typical of the 1970s and 1980s, and, on the other hand, the “rebellion of memory” which
emerged in the 1990s.
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Portuguese Armed Organisations in Context
The  exercise  of  context  reconstruction  and  exploration  is  greatly  important  for  the
understanding of how and why political violent organisations came into existence in Portugal
(in different periods of time and in different political and social conditions), and how violence
was legitimised by some and demonised by others1.
The present  article is  solely focused on political  violence committed by non-state
actors and during three specific periods: pre-, counter- and post-revolution. During this time
span of  almost  three  decades (1962-1987),  six  different  violent  organisations emerged in
Portugal.  In  the first  wave  (1962-1974),  Estado  Novo2,  in  a  very  clear  and  direct  way,
determined the emergence of the LUAR (League of Unity and Armed Revolution), the ARA
(Revolutionary  Armed  Action)  and  the  BR  (Revolutionary  Brigades)  –  the  three
revolutionary organisations which fought against the regime and its policies, predominantly
the ones related to imperial, colonial and capitalist standpoints. These organisations resorted
to violence against a regime which in their eyes was extremely violent and repressive and
which could not be defeated by pacifist means.  The latter had been tried for years without
success  and  at  a  high  personal  cost  (e.g.  arrests,  torture,  forced  labour)  (Antunes  1974;
Narciso 2000; Mortágua 2013; Pimentel 2014). In the second wave (1975-1976), the rise of
the  reactionary  organisations  the  ELP  (Portuguese  Liberation  Army)  and  the  MDLP
(Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal) was triggered by fear of a possible
communist  occupation  following the  Revolution  and by  disagreement  with  the  decisions
taken  by  the  provisional  government  (e.g.  decolonisation).  These  organisations  were
essentially composed of right-wing military personnel, who in the majority of cases leaned
towards the deposed regime. In the third wave (1980-1987), the revolutionary organisation
the  FP-25  (Popular  Forces  of  the  25th April)  believed  that  the  ideals  defended  by  the
Revolution were fading away, giving place to the return of the unjust capitalist society of the
past. This was a situation that in their perspective only a socialist revolution could solve. The
1 We acknowledge that some of the matters approached here are also relevant in other dictatorial
contexts (e.g., Spain under Franco, Italy under Mussolini, Greece under the Cornels). However, it is
not our ambition to explore them in this article, due to the limited space at our disposal. 
2Estado Novo (New State) is the designation given by António de Oliveira Salazar to the regime he
gave birth to and intended to rule.  Estado Novo represented the embodiment of power and a strong
state organized around  a strong figure – Salazar was the answer to the claims of the reactionary
factions of the bourgeoisie, of a good part of the Catholic Church, and of some intellectuals during the
First  Republic for a strong and competent government,  which could bring an end to the existing
financial, political, social and cultural turmoil (Amaro, 1982).
following figure (Figure 1) provides a timeline that depicts both the main historical events
which set the context for the rise of armed organisations in Portugal, and the period of action
and characterization of these same organisations.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In addition, Table 1 sets the political context behind the activity of each armed organisation
under analysis, as well as their main characteristics. It is important to recognise explicitly
here that the literature available on the action of armed organisations in Portugal is  very
scarce, and does not allow an even exploration and presentation of information. This is due to
the fact that material available about some organisations (e.g., details about the armed actions
carried out) is not available about others.
[Insert Table 1 here]
First wave: Estado Novo
Estado Novo is a period of Portuguese history that has its origins in the military coup of 28
May  1926. This  military  coup  ended  the  First  Republic3 and  established  a  military
dictatorship in Portugal, which at first did not have a well-defined ideology, but did have a
deep scepticism regarding the effectiveness of parliamentary democracy. The first months of
the military dictatorship established which faction of the movement which deposed the First
Republic would be in power – the liberal-republicans or the conservatives – a fight won by
the conservatives on 9 July 1926 (Mattoso, 1994). In this context, all attention and hopes
turned to Salazar. He was an important figure from the Catholic Centre, who seemed to hold
the key to the country’s financial problems4 and at the same time did not appear as a political
threat,  not  exhibiting  any  political  affiliation  and  even  showing  reticence  in  accepting  a
political position (Mattoso, 1994). Thus, on 18 April 1928 Salazar assumed the Ministry of
3The  revolution  of  5th October  1910  marks  the  end  of  the  Constitutional  Monarchy  in
Portugal  (1820-1910)  and  the  beginning  of  the  First  Republic.  This  political  period  was
always  followed  by  great  difficulties  of  consolidation,  which  were  evident  through  the
existence of  a  deep political,  economic and social  crisis,  manifested,  for  instance,  in  the
existence of successive governments, in the assassination of the republic president Sidónio
Pais, in 1918, and in the ten coup attempts between 1921 and 1926 (Mattoso, 1994; Saraiva,
1993).
4Salazar was very critical of the financial policies put in place by the July 9th government
headed by Óscar Carmona in the presidency, and by Sinel de Cordes in the Finance Ministry,
which took shape through various  newspaper  publications,  where  he started  building his
image as a very serious and competent man (Pinto, 2010).
Finance  for  the  second  time5.  This  made  him  a  very  powerful  minister  in  the  difficult
financial  conjuncture  that  Portugal  was  going  through  (Pinto,  2010).  Salazar  did  not,
however, only have a financial solution for the country, which assigned balance to the its
economy and kept him in the same position through several different governments (Mattoso,
1994).  He  also  had  a  political  programme in  mind  –  the  foundation  of  a  new political,
economic and social order, based on an authoritarian state (Oliveira, 1990).
In order to accomplish his mission, Salazar based the regime on “a mythical idea of
nation and national interest” (Rosas, 2001, p.1032). In addition, he aimed, similarly to fascist
regimes in Europe, to create a new type of Portuguese people, regenerated by the regime’s
ideology (Cabrera, 2014) and a “new order”, which would end the liberal century and start
the re-education of the Portuguese people in the context of a regenerated nation (Rosas, 2001,
p.1033).
In order to preserve such a “new order” and to exert its authority as wide as possible,
Estado Novo fashioned and implemented different societal structures, which functioned as the
“keepers  of  order”.  Among  those,  three  were  central  to  trigger  the  activity  of  armed
organisations in Portugal: 1) the absence of political freedom, represented by the existence of
a single party – the National Union; 2) the absence of freedom of expression, represented by
the  censorship;  and  3)  the  existence  of  a  political  police,  responsible  for  the
institutionalization of violence and for the forced labour camp Penal Colony of Cape Verde.
It is also important to  highlight that in the popular discourse  Estado Novo is often
referred to as fascism. This label does not always receive support in academic circles because
although it is considered to have been an authoritarian regime, Estado Novo did not portray
all  the  characteristics  of  an ideal  type of  fascism6.  The same often happened to  Spanish
Francoism. This argument was countered by Enzo Collotti (1989), who considered that the
restriction of the liberty of expression, the repression of the political opposition, the violence
against  civilians  perpetrated by the  political  police,  the  corporativism that  eradicated the
labour movement’s autonomy, and the moralising nature of the state in its intent to control
every soul are enough to classify this Portuguese regime as fascism.
The  implementation  of  Salazar’s  political  intent  resulted  in  a  strong  wave  of
opposition throughout the year of 1931, including revolts in Madeira, Azores and Guinea led
5The first time was in the first year of the military dictatorship and only lasted a few days (3rd
– 19th July 1926), because the government he was part of was quickly replaced.
6This exclusion is related to the fact that a fascist dynamic, where a single party mobilises the
masses and seizes power, was not at the origin of Estado Novo. In reality, Estado Novo was
originated by one individual who took control of the government and transformed a military
dictatorship into a dictatorial regime (Nolte, 1966).
by the Reviralho7, student demonstrations against the dictatorship in Lisbon and Oporto, and
the  action  of  the  liberal  conservatives  who  still  believed  in  constitutional  normalisation
through elections (Pimentel, 2014).  However, the Portuguese opposition during Estado Novo
was always permeated with  various  difficulties,  especially  before  the  1940s.  These  were
years in which the regime was being consolidated, the repression strengthened and organised,
the opposition dispersed and fascism expanded in Europe (Raby, 1988).  However,  during
World War II and its aftermath, the increasing international challenge to authoritarian regimes
had consequences for the opposition in Portugal. In 1941, the Portuguese Communist Party
(PCP) was able to set up a clandestine structure and a strategy of infiltration in the official
trade  unions.  Across  the  1940s  and  1950s,  different  opposition  movements  emerged  in
Portugal, such as the Anti-Fascist National Unity Movement (MUNAF) and the Democratic
Unity Movement (MUD). However, these organisations’ activities were completely restrained
by the regime. In the beginning of the 1960’s, different groups of individuals exiled in South
America (particularly in Venezuela and Brazil) instigated some very important actions against
Estado Novo. Among these were the assault on the  Portuguese ocean liner  Santa Maria in
1961, the assault on the military quarter of Beja in 1962 and, in the same year, the diversion
of the TAP aircraft  responsible for the connection Casablanca-Lisbon, which flew at low
altitude over  Portugal,  dropping leaflets  denouncing the  atrocities  of  the  regime (Santos,
2011).
The 1960s carried a new wave of worldwide uprisings that in Portugal coincided the
beginning of  the  Colonial  War in  Africa in  1961,  growth of  internal  instability  with the
replacement  of  Salazar  by  Marcelo  Caetano  in  1969,  and  increasing  awareness  of
revolutionary  movements  around  the  world  (Leitão  &  Pina,  1975).  These  circumstances
strongly influenced and intensified the political opposition in Portugal,  exacerbating anti-
fascist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist positions and originating a movement towards the
release  of  people  from an  oppressive  regime (Leitão  and  Pina,  1975).  At  that  time,  the
perception of armed struggle as a way out of an entrenched situation began to emerge as a
possibility,  gaining supporters and replacing the traditional reformist  discourse8 (Bebiano,
2006a). Thus, in this setting, three of the organisations under analysis in the present study –
the LUAR, the ARA and the BR – took up arms and fought  Estado Novo through political
violent means.
7Democratic and liberal republican opposition which from the start opposed the dictatorship
established  in  Portugal  on  28th May 1926,  and  tried  several  times  to  restore  the  regime
initiated on 5th October 1910.
8The unforeseen defeat of General Humberto Delgado in the electoral process of 1958 was
not accepted as free or credible, causing the opposition to start questioning the heretofore
defended reformist measures.
Second and third waves: Revolution and democracy
The revolution of 25 April 1974 was the last leftist revolution in Europe, bringing an end to
one of the lengthiest dictatorships of the 20th century (Rezola, 2007). At the micro level, such
a revolution is often considered  to be totally unexpected, as Narciso (2000), Santos (2011)
and Mortágua (2013) describe in their memoirs. However, a macro analysis indicates many
signs of a regime marked by deep crisis, particularly in its last decade, such as:
a) The Roman Catholic  church, one of  the pillars  of  the regime,  prompted different
actions against the Colonial War9, which were influenced by Pope Paul VI himself,
who in  1970  received  a  group  of  liberation  movements’ representatives  from the
Portuguese  colonies,  placing  into  question  the  validity  of  the  regime’s  positions
(Bebiano, 2006a);
b) The young urban students and workers were increasingly politicized and influenced
by extreme-left ideologies, in a context of industrialization, war and forced exile in
foreign countries, and were targeted by a violent repression10 (Cruzeiro & Bebiano,
2006; Loff, 2006);
c) The Colonial War on three different fronts, which started in 1961, in Angola, and
spread to Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, was draining the armed forces (Rezola,
2007);
d) The Portuguese in the colonies  started protesting both against  the regime and the
armed forces which were not able to protect them from the violent attacks perpetrated
by the liberation movements (Rezola, 2007);
e) The pressure of the international community on the regime was renewed, due to the
denunciation of the Wiriyamu massacre in Mozambique by Adrian Hastings, a Roman
Catholic priest (Hastings, 1973);  
f) The armed forces attempted coup in March 1974 (Rezola, 2007); and
g) The economic difficulties Portugal was facing, particularly due to the war and to the
oil crisis of 1973 (Rezola, 2007).
9Actions originated both from priests and lay groups and essentially marked by the arrest of
the priest Mário de Oliveira, who used to preach against the Colonial War; and by the Capela
do Rato Watch,  a initiative that happened on the 1972-1973 new year’s eve and stated the
Catholic church position against the Colonial War and the dictatorial regime.
10In January 1974 thirty students were arrested.
Thus, Portugal could be compared to a “pressure cooker”, ready to explode by itself or with
some encouragement (Pimentel, 2011, p.22). Help that indeed came, but from an unexpected
player. The player on which the regime had relied the most – the armed forces.
Thus, in 1973 the Movement of Captains was created.  This resulted from discontent
among  the  military  in  the  face  of  the  policies  of  Caetano’s  government,  namely  the
continuation of the Colonial War.  In addition, February 1974 saw the launch of the book
Portugal and the Future by General Spínola, who was at the time deputy chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces. In the book, he stated that the only solution to the Colonial War
was  not  armed,  but  political,  through  the  recognition  of  the  right  of  people  to  self-
determination (Spínola,  1974). This stance, taken by such an important figure, triggered an
implosion  in  the  regime.  It  caused  the  dismissal  of  the  General,  but  it  also  realised  the
regime’s worst fear by leading the young captains to revolt. 
Thus, from the moment of creation of the  Movement of Captains in August 1973
onwards,  a  part  of  the  military  connected  to  General  Spínola  did  not  stop  planning  the
military coup, which finally took place on 25 April  1974. This was a military coup that
quickly became a social revolution amongst the Portuguese people, who flooded the streets of
the country supporting the armed forces and claiming the end of the regime. These people
were  finally  able  to  actively  participate  in  the  “transitional  process  towards  a  fully
institutionalized democracy” which finished in April 1976 with the implementation of a new
constitution (Loff, 2014, p.3).
This revolution prompted deep structural transformations in Portugal, particularly at
economic, social and cultural levels (Rezola, 2007). However, it also triggered new waves of
armed action in the country, initially starred by the ELP and the MDLP in 1975, and later, in
1980, by the FP-25. These are the three last organisations under analysis in the present study.
The waves of violence which occurred after the April Revolution were caused by the
reaction of two different factions – the extreme right and the extreme left – to the changes
introduced by the democratic process. The first wave took place in the summer of 1975 and
was motivated by the belief (held by the conservative and pro-regime people in Portuguese
society), that the April Revolution had opened up the possibility for the implementation of a
“Marxist/Communist/collectivist/totalitarian dictatorship worse than Salazar’s” (Loff, 2014,
p.2). This was, thus, the context of the eruption of popular anti-communist violence in the so-
called Hot Summer of 1975, particularly in the north and central regions of Portugal, which
were rural areas mainly composed of Roman Catholic small landowners. These landowners
did not receive well the socialist proposals of the Revolution Council in power and, in some
cases,  responded  to  the  call  of  reactionary  individuals  and  organisations  to  show  their
dissatisfaction  by  attacking  Communist  Party  headquarters  (Cerezales,  2003).
Simultaneously,  two  armed  organisations  (the  ELP and  the  MDLP)  were  steering  and
contributing to these popular activities from Spain,  composed of conservative individuals
who sought exile in this country after the unsuccessful coup of 11 March 1975 (Dâmaso,
1997). These were organisations that in the midst of a clearly divided world characterised by
the  bipolar  rivalries  of  the  Cold  War,  and  of  a  Portugal  on  the  verge  of  a  civil  war11,
considered that they would be able “to invade the country and defeat the communists by force
of arms” (Dâmaso, 1997, p.11).
The denouement of this very troubled period in Portuguese political history came on
25 November 1975, when a coup attempted by the extreme-left sector of the military was
frustrated by Coronel Ramalho Eanes’ troops, giving origin to an institutionalized democratic
regime (Maxwell, 1999). Thus, 25 November 1975 marked the end of the armed offensive
from  the  extreme-right  (Dâmaso,  1997),  which  saw  its  concerns  regarding  a  potential
communist invasion disappear. However, this date also laid the foundations for a new wave
of political violence, this time conducted by the extreme-left (Costa, 2004).
Thus, the FP-25 emerged in 1980 with two main purposes. First, to stop the actions of
the extreme right once again in power due to the counter-revolution of 25 November 1975,
which re-established the capitalist  order,  repressing the proliferous social  movements and
even some rights obtained by the workers after the April Revolution (Sousa, 1992). Second,
to attain a real socialist revolution (Costa, 2004).
State of the art
In the Portuguese context, themes such as political violence and armed struggle have been
very  little  explored,  and  the  few  existent  studies  have  been  mainly  conducted  through
historiographic lenses and based on document analysis. This leaves a gap in the field of social
and human sciences  research,  which  takes  into  account,  for  instance,  personal  stories  of
involvement  in  politically  motivated  violence,  as  well  as  attempts  to  produce  in-depth
accounts of this social phenomenon. In this section, we will map the relevant literature about
the  Portuguese  armed  struggle  which  took  place  in  the  three  different  periods  of  time
considered in this article.
11The Revolution caused a partisan run for power among the left forces repressed during the
dictatorship (e.g. Communist Party) and some emergent ones (e.g. Socialist Party) and an
inexistent right that was trying to organize itself around figures of the former regime. This
partisan  game  ended  by  dividing  society  into  ‘good  and  bad  guys’,  or  ‘democrats’ and
‘reactionaries’ respectively, giving birth to deep hatred, injustices and violence committed by
both sides (Dâmaso, 1997, p.14).
In order to collect the sources mentioned, we performed an online literature search
using a series of keywords. We also implemented the so-called “snowball method” to find
additional possible relevant manuscripts by examining the reference lists of manuscripts that
were considered suitable to include in the review. We decided to not focus on media coverage
of the phenomena under study since this has been already done (see Soutelo, 2015a).
Pre-revolution period (1967-1974)
According  to  the  Portuguese  History  Dictionary,  armed  struggle  in  Portugal  took  place
through  the  republican  activities  conducted  between  1927  and  1936,  the  assault  on  the
military quarter of Beja in 1961 and the activities of the LUAR, the ARA and the BR (Serrão
et  al.  1999).  This  is  corroborated  by  the  definition  proposed  by  Estado  Novo’s  History
Dictionary,  which  describes  armed  struggle  in  Portugal  as  the  “actions  carried  out  by
organised civil groups of a political-military nature and whose essential objective was the
erosion  of  the  rear  guard  of  the  regime,  the  realisation  of  initiatives  whose  nature  and
exemplary character could mobilize the population against the power of the Estado Novo or
the preparation of an armed uprising” (Rosas & Brito 1996, p.  526).  In this  context,  the
LUAR, the ARA and the BR are equally perceived as the organisations which carried out
armed  struggle  in  Portugal.  This  is  corroborated  by  Irene  Pimentel’s  History  of  the
Opposition to the Dictatorship (1926-1974), which maps the different types of opposition
suffered by Estado Novo’s regime since its conception, until its downfall, also including the
armed struggle conducted by those three organisations (Pimentel 2014).
The  doctoral  research  conducted  by  Miguel  Cardina  on  the  Portuguese  Marxist-
Leninist organisations, which resulted in a book (Cardina 2011), filled the knowledge gap
about this type of organisations. However, it did not give a primordial place to politically
motivated violence committed by such organisations.  The same has happened with other
studies focussed on the student protests against Estado Novo’s regime, the labour movement,
the political repression or the opposition to the Colonial War. The only exceptions are the
doctoral research of Ana Sofia Ferreira and Raquel da Silva which specifically studied the
armed organisations which fought  Estado Novo’s regime (Ferreira 2015a, 2015b; Da Silva
2016).
The majority of the literature produced on the history of the Portuguese Communist
Party  (PCP)  ignores  the  debates  around  the  use  of  politically  motivated  violence  which
happened  from the  late  1950s,  with  the  exception  of  João  Madeira’s  book.  This  author
explored the PCP’s dynamics which caused the postponement of their involvement in the
armed struggle until the 1970s (Madeira 2013).
In the 1980s, there were two important scholarly contributions regarding the rise of
the Portuguese radical left and armed organisations made by João Paulo Martins and Rui
Loureiro (Madeira & Loureiro 1980a, 1980b). Despite some errors and omissions, these were
for quite some time the more in-depth studies on the subject of politically motivated violence
against Estado Novo’s regime.
Rui  Bebiano  wrote  about  the  social  context  lived  in  Portugal  in  the  1960s.  This
context  was  marked  by  accounts  of  international  armed  violence  (e.g.,  Latin  America,
Vietnam, Palestine, Northern Ireland), of our own Colonial War, of the first movements of the
exiled Portuguese opposition (e.g., the assault on the Portuguese ocean liner ‘Santa Maria’ in
1961) (Bebiano 2006a) and of the rise of armed struggle in Portugal.
There is also one article published by Tereza Viegas dedicated to the BR, listing the
actions carried out by this organisation, as well as its ideological influences and aims (Viegas
1996).
A  few  former  pre-revolution  militants  have  also  been  prolific  regarding  the
publication  of  their  memoirs.  Among  them  Camilo  Mortágua,  one  of  LUAR’s  leaders
(Mortágua 2013), Francisco Miguel (Miguel 1977), Jaime Serra (Serra 1999) and Raimundo
Narciso (Narciso 2000), members of ARA’s central command and Carlos Antunes, one of
BR’s  founders  (Antunes  1974). Some  pre-revolution  militants  have  opted  for  a  semi-
academic route, combining some research (mainly document analysis, but also interviews)
and their  own personal  experience.  Fernando Pereira Marques from LUAR, for  instance,
published his first book in 1976 where he gathered some of the documents he had written
about the organisation (Marques 1976), and recently combined his personal testimony, the
testimonies  of  other  LUAR  militants,  abundant  documentation  and  his  experience  as  a
historian to produce his  latest book about the armed organisations which contributed to the
fall of Estado Novo’s regime, in particular the LUAR (Marques 2016). Two more examples
are the work of Hipólito dos Santos on the years he spent with LUAR (1967-1970), where he
covers the activities of the organisation, its structure, financing and infiltrations (Santos 2011)
and the work of Isabel do Carmo, one of BR’s co-founders, who recounts her experience of
life underground, as well as other similar armed struggles across Europe in the 1960s and
1970s (Carmo, 2017). Finally, the journalist Isabel Lindim, Isabel do Carmo’s daughter, has
been collecting documents about the BR since 2007 (thereby establishing a physical, as well
as a digital archive) and interviewed fourteen former BR women, which in turn led to her
writing a book about their experiences (Lindim 2012). However, it is interesting to note that
in some of the books (e.g., Narciso 2000; Lindim 2012) pseudonyms are still kept, because
people fear discrimination in their social circles.
Counter-revolution period (1975-1976)
Literature concerning the right-wing armed organisations which fought in the couple of years
that followed the April Revolution is even scarcer. The first two books on the subject were
authored by journalists, one Portuguese and the other German, and published in 1976. Carlos
Dugos’ book is very interesting because it is solely based on interviews with both ELP and
MDLP militants living in Spain and preparing a counter-revolution that would restore order
and stop a perceived communist invasion in Portugal (Dugos 1976). Günter Wallraff’s book
is developed from his own covert operation within MDLP. This journalist aimed to reveal this
organisation’s plans with regard to a counter-revolutionary coup in Portugal (Wallraff 1976).
However, the most comprehensive work on this subject was produced by Eduardo
Dâmaso.  This  book  covers  the  involvement  of  the  Catholic  church  in  the  counter-
revolutionary activities of right-wing organisations, such as the MDLP or the Maria da Fonte
Movement, discusses the counter-revolutionary activities of the ELP and covers the polemic
Bomber Network, which in 1976 committed daily attacks in the country (Dâmaso 1997). In
the same vein,  the journalist Miguel Carvalho has recently published a book on the armed
violence  carried  out  by  the  ELP and  the  MDLP after  the  April  Revolution,  trying  to
demonstrate that this period was characterized by enormous violence (Carvalho, 2017).
Riccardo Marchi has also produced a great amount of literature on the Portuguese
right-wing, however,  he only deals  superficially with the political  violence committed by
organisations such as the ELP or the MDLP (Marchi 2012).
There are also two books of memoirs produced by MDLP militants. The first one was
authored by Alpoim Calvão, MDLP’s operational leader. It covers his life from the moment
he moved with his family to the Portuguese colony of Mozambique as a 14-year-old boy until
his involvement in the creation of the MDLP after the April Revolution (Calvão 1976). The
second one was authored by Rui Hortelão, Luís Sanches Baêna and Abel Melo e Sousa and is
about Alpoim Calvão’s life. The authors consider it as “an almost biography” (Hortelão et al.
2012).
Post-revolution period (1980-1987)
On the subject of the FP-25, two militants’ memoirs are recorded. One of them – The Ashes
of a Lost Time – was published in 1985 by one of the repentants (i.e. a militant who after
arrest decided to collaborate with the police) of the organisation. The book is, in some way,
an attempt to justify his  militancy in the FP-25, as well  as  its  choice of denouncing the
organisation to the police (Macedo, 1985). In the other – Asphalt Guerrilla: the FP-25 and the
Portuguese Time – the author tells of his experience as a militant in the FP-25 (Sousa 1992).
The FP-25 was also the focus of two other books. One written by a former inspector
of the judiciary police – Terrorism and the FP-25 Years Later – which covers in detail the
organisation’s activities (Costa 2004). The other written by a journalist – To Live and to Die
in the Name of the FP-25 – which equally covers the organisation’s activities, but also the
whole judicial  process,  including interviews with judges,  magistrates and judiciary police
inspectors (Vilela 2005).
The Post-Dictatorship Memory Politics and Political Narratives in Portugal
The debates surrounding the Portuguese armed struggle have been historically undervalued
by the social and human sciences in this country. This is a phenomenon that even takes place
in  the  context  of research  projects  on  the  opposition  to  Estado  Novo’s  regime  or  the
revolutionary period of 1974-1975. Such research projects tend to be limited to a generic and
superficial  approach.  Even  militants’ memoirs  only  began  to  appear,  with  one  or  two
exceptions, from the late 1990s onwards, becoming more common in the early twenty-first
century.
This scenario leads to the question: why is this so? We argue that the answer to such a
question starts in the late 1970s with the rise of post-dictatorship memory politics, which
encompassed  a  historical  revisionism  that  sought  to  whitewash  the  memory  of  the
dictatorship and deny the revolutionary genesis of democracy in Portugal.
However, rewinding a few years, it is possible to see that it was not always so. In the
two years between 25 April 1974 and the adoption of the constitution in April 1976, there
was a “liberation of memory from oppression” (Loff 2015, p. 29), expressed through, for
instance:  the  tributes  paid  to  the  victims  of  the  political  police  and  to  the  anti-fascist
resistance, the publication of texts in which Estado Novo’s repression in Portugal and in the
colonies  was  denounced,  the  publication  of  memoirs  of  the  ex-prisoners  of  the  Tarrafal
concentration camp in Cape Vert and of the anarchists of the 1920s and 1930s who fought the
regime.  Although  at  this  point,  the  anti-fascist  memory  gained  a  clear  hegemony in  the
political narratives, it did not last long. In fact, the 25 April 1974 Revolution and the Ongoing
Revolutionary Process12 which followed it,  quenched the memory of the organisations that
carried out armed actions against  Estado Novo’s regime, because the opposition’s preferred
political  narrative  did  not  focus  on  such  acts  nor  did  it  value  them.  Actually,  such
organisations, as well as their armed activity, started to be perceived as marginal and, to some
extent, eccentric, a sort of exception in the history of resistance, which did not deserve to be
framed academically. To this contributed the circumstances that started in the morning of the
25 April 1974. The captains’ military coup became a revolution that gave origin to moments
of historical acceleration, as was the case of 28 September 197413 or 11 March 197514. In this
context, it was mainly the radical left groups, whether they had carried out armed actions
against the dictatorship or had only theorized about this necessity, who worked towards the
radicalisation of the process. Their objective was the seizure of power by the workers and the
creation of a socialist society. From March 1975 onwards, these sectors of the radical left
were  the  protagonists  of  some  of  the  most  emblematic  confrontations  of  the  Ongoing
Revolutionary  Process:  the  occupation  of  the  newspaper  República and  of  the  Radio
Renascença, robbing them both of the tutelage of the Socialist Party (the main centre-left
party in Portugal)  and of the Catholic Church; as well  as  the Spanish embassy’s assault,
which happened as a radical form of protest for the death sentence of three FRAP (Anti-
Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front) and two ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) militants,
which were two of the main anti-Franco  organisations (Rosas 2004). In addition, the most
reactionary sectors of the Portuguese right-wing also decided, in the Summer of 1975, to take
part in armed violence. These organisations were based in Spain and in the north of Portugal
and had the support of sectors of the Catholic hierarchy and right-wing parties (Dugos 1976).
Both organisations  urged northern populations  to  attack and set  fire  to  left-wing parties’
headquarters (Cerezales 2003a). In this period, extreme-right organisations were also part of
larger  operations,  such  as  the  murder  of  Father  Max  in  a  bomb  attack,  and  the  bomb
explosion at  the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon, which killed two embassy employees. These
were just two among dozens of other bomb attacks against people connected to the PCP and
other leftist organisations (Dâmaso 1997; Carvalho 2017).
The  military  movements  or  counter-revolution,  as  it  is  called  by  some,  of  25
November 1975 closed the revolutionary phase of the process of transition to democracy,
12Commonly known in Portuguese as PREC – Processo Revolucionário em Curso.
13This was the day of a mass demonstration planned by General António Spínola, the then President
of the Republic, in order to show that the majority of the population did not support the radical ways
in which the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) was running the country. However, the demonstration
was blocked by the MFA and the president sent into exile in Spain.
14On this date, there was a failed attempt at an anti-communist coup led by General António Spínola,
which  contributed  to  the  further  radicalisation  of  the  Ongoing  Revolutionary  Process,  including
arrests of figures of the fallen regime.
which meant the defeat of radical leftist organisations and movements in Portugal (Cerqueira
2015).  Such a  defeat  was further  legitimised by the loss  of  the  left  in  the constitutional
elections of 1975, as well as in the presidential elections of 1976. From then on, a new stage
began  with  the  institutionalization  of  a  representative  democracy.  In  this  context,  the
triumphant political sectors sought to halt and defuse the revolutionary transformations that
had occurred in the previous two years, even though they were constitutionally consecrated
(e.g., the agrarian reform and various nationalisations) (Rosas 2004). This new framework,
the herald of political stability, allowed Portugal to formally submit an application to the
European Economic Community (EEC) in March 1977. This process of institutionalization of
democracy in Portugal was also accompanied by an effort to reconcile Portuguese society,
creating an environment that allowed the absence of condemnation and an amnesty for those,
both from the political right and left wings, who had engaged in armed violence (Camacho
2011).  These  aspects  were,  then,  the  foundation  for  the  reconfiguration  of  memorialist
discourses and of memory politics, creating political narratives which deliberately devalued
the memory of the anti-fascist resistance and of the April Revolution, and which rewrote the
more recent history in an objective process of historical revisionism (Rosas 2016).
Thus,  in  Portugal,  from  the  late  1970s  to  the  early  1990s,  there  was  a  clear
devaluation of the memory of resistance to the dictatorship, both regarding its peaceful and
violent components. This coincided with the country being governed by the right-wing from
1978 until 1995. These years were marked by a serious economic and social crisis, which was
blamed, by the political and economic elites, on the revolutionary process. In their view, such
a  process  was  responsible  for  the  country’s  economic  problems  due  to  the  political
confrontations it caused, to the decolonisation and to the sectarianism of the parties whose
political project had been defeated on 25 November 1975 (the PCP and the radical left).
Moreover, the political project of Cavaco Silva, prime minister of Portugal between 1985 and
1995, neoconservative and economically neoliberal, required the rejection of the Portuguese
Revolution as a historical experience. He stressed that “the Portuguese society lived in 1974-
1975  a  period  of  exacerbated  political  agitation  and  of  predominance  of  ideological
discourse”  (Silva  1987,  p.  386),  thus  contributing  to  the  demonization  of  the  Ongoing
Revolutionary Process.  At  this  point,  such a  process  came to  be seen as  responsible  for
almost causing a civil war and tended to be described with adjectives in the semantic field of
madness and disease (Loff 2015, p. 65). However, it also served to underline the fact that it
was a process that only the moderate forces which led the 25 November 1975 managed to
stop.  Furthermore,  from 1989 onwards,  the Portuguese government  adopted a totalitarian
reading of the April Revolution, arguing that the leftist forces aimed to replace Estado Novo’s
regime by a communist/Marxist dictatorship (Loff 2015, p. 73). All these efforts, once again,
implied a negative memory of the April Revolution and of the revolutionary process. In this
vein, the rhetoric of the pacification of the Portuguese society and of the reconciliation with
the past blocked and inhibited any debate on revolutionary violence, anti-fascist resistance,
Estado Novo or April Revolution.
Despite  having  taken  on  such  specificities  in Portugal,  the  historical  revisionism
phenomenon  is  in  some  way  underpinned  by  its  emergence  in  most  Western  European
countries, accompanied by the political rise of right-wing parties, as well as neoliberal and
neoconservative political, economic and social values throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in the
context of the crisis of Marxism and of the Left. However, it became a social phenomenon in
the 1990s, coinciding with the deepest crisis of the left which followed the implosion of the
Soviet  bloc  (Soutelo  2015b,  p.  216).  In  this  context,  Fernando  Rosas  considers  that  the
legitimising  ideological  paradigm  of  most  post-war  Western  societies  undergoes  an
unprecedented subversive pressure with the advent of Thatcherism and of Reaganism and the
overthrow  of  the  Soviet  world,  designed  to  legitimize  the  establishment  of  a  new
neoconservative and capitalist course  (Rosas 2016, p. 62). Additionally, Pier Paolo Poggio
argues  that  in  the  post-1989  world,  anti-communism  was  the  link  among  the  various
historical revisionisms and the liberal and conservative political forces it represents (Poggio,
2006, p.211).
Manuela  Cruzeiro  identifies  two  main  currents  of  historical  revisionism  in  the
Portuguese historiography: the first one is focussed on continuity,  by devaluing  the April
Revolution  and  its  consequences  and  emphasising  a  continuity  between  dictatorship  and
democracy; and the second one, supported by most people, writes the history of the victors,
analysing the history of the April Revolution centred on their perspective (Cruzeiro 2011, pp.
126-131).  The  first  current  perceives  the  April  Revolution  as  a  historical  breakdown,
objectively whitewashing the previous regime. The second current, politically steeped in the
triumphant  regime  brought  by  the  25  November  1975  counter-revolution,  privileges  the
historical reading which recognises the role of the winning political and military forces. It
underestimates  the  role  of  other  readings  which  seek  to  highlight  the  role  of  social
movements and the role of political violence in the transition process. This is an elitist, partial
historical  reading  that  implies  the  implicit  or  explicit  condemnation  of  the  political
organisations of the radical left. In this sense, the reading of the political violence which took
place during the dictatorship, in the April Revolution and as a consequence of it, is done from
a negative and prejudiced perspective.
The historical revisionism which marked the Portuguese society in the twenty years
after the April Revolution was also strongly supported by the fact that the main archives for
the  study  of  the  dictatorship  were  kept  closed  for  a  very  long  time  (until  1996).  This
documental  obstruction  was  justified  in  public  discourses  by  those  responsible  for  the
archival politics in the country (among  them Borges de Macedo, director of the National
Archives  between  1990  and  1996)  as  an  attitude  of  caution,  particularly  with  regard  to
military archives.  According to such views, it  was necessary to exercise extreme caution
when  accessing  contemporary  sources,  since  they  could  contain  personal  information
regarding numerous figures of Portuguese political and social life, who could be still alive or
who could be dead and whose memory would be tarnished (Rocha 1990; Braga 1994). This
was, in essence, a policy that, according to Fernando Rosas cited in Loff (2015, p. 89), was
“marked by strong hostility giving access to researchers”.
For the history of the organisations which embarked on armed struggle, the issue of
access  to  archives  by  researchers  still  poses  another  problem:  the  lack  of  systematised
archives per organisation, circumscribing the documentary territory to the archives kept by
the  police,  the  judicial  system and individuals.  Actually,  the  majority  of  the  information
regarding pre-revolution organisations can be found in the political police archive. Obviously,
such documents cannot be ignored, but they equally pose serious difficulties to the researcher
due to their nature. Firstly, most information was obtained coercively and with the use of
flagrant  violence.  Secondly,  the  police  interrogation  records  are  composed of  inaccurate,
often lacunar, and very partial questions and answers. Thirdly, in their reports, the police
commonly  omitted  or  falsified  facts  or  objects  of  the  investigation  in  order  to  extract
evidence that could support a conviction in court and provide data that could be investigated
by other individuals (Pimentel 2007; Cardina 2010). Therefore, although this archive is a
fundamental source of documentation, it requires more robust questioning and should not be
used as standalone information. In terms of the documentation regarding both counter- and
post-revolution organisations, it is mostly dispersed throughout the different courts where the
trials were conducted. In addition, on the one hand, such courts do not tend to organise their
files, which creates difficulties in finding them, and, on the other hand, researchers often
simply see their access requests denied. Finally,  a considerable amount of documentation
lives in personal archives, access to which depends on the empathy or trusting relationship
that can be established with the researcher. However, in recent years, there has been a change
of attitude towards personal archives, with many of their owners depositing them in archival
institutions such as the 25 April Documentation Centre or the Mário Soares Foundation. This
allows the preservation of the historical memory and provides the possibility of making them
accessible to research.
Nevertheless,  according  to  Manuel  Loff,  from  the  1990s  onwards  we  have  been
experiencing a “rebellion of memory” (Loff 2000, pp. 189-199), as a reaction to twenty years
of aggressive historical revisionism which devalued the memory of anti-fascist resistance,
particularly regarding the armed organisations. Consequently,  in this period, public debates
concerned with a “sheer whitewashing of the dictatorship” by right-wing governments began
to take place (Loff 2014, p.10). Such debates were triggered by the public acknowledgement
that former political police members were receiving pensions for “exceptional and relevant
services rendered to the country”, as well as retired military men who fought in the Colonial
War, while Captains of the Revolution, such as Salgueiro Maia, were denied their pensions.
These  were  circumstances  that  showed  a  clear  depreciation  of  the  military  men  who
contributed to the overthrow of the dictatorship. However, the last straw, according to Loff
(2014), came in 1994 when a commercial TV station organised a debate between a  former
political police member (Óscar Cardoso), a historian who had been a political prisoner (José
Manuel  Tengarrinha)  and a  former  member  of  the  Revolution Council  (Sousa  e  Castro),
giving the opportunity to the first to draw a positive picture of the political police and to deny
the torture practices and executions carried out by this institution during the dictatorship. This
debate raised serious controversies, leading, for instance, the republic president at the time
and anti-Salazarist resistant Mário Soares (1994) to affirm: “it was as if [Klaus] Barbie – the
butcher of Marseille – had been invited to a debate with his own victims. […] What are we
going to tell our children after they have watched this debate on TV? That we have imagined
this whole story? What on earth will be our legacy?” A few right-wing personalities equally
contributed  to  this  debate,  reiterating  their  perspective  that  the  April  Revolution  was
undoubtedly  worse  than  Salazar’s  dictatorship,  and  recalling  the  atrocities  that  in  their
opinion  happened  in  the  country  afterwards  –  “nobody  recalled  the  arbitrary  arrests,
censorship, intimidation, tipping off, manipulation, slander, death threats, torture and injuries,
squatting in properties, purges, destruction and other post-April 25th savagery. It was not the
PIDE [political police] who did those. It was the MFA-PCP [Movement of the Armed Forces
– Portuguese Communist  Party] alliance of rejuvenating memory, that true spittle on our
country’s democratisation process” – and in the colonies as a result of the decolonisation
process  –  “they  [the  leftist  individuals  composing  the  Revolution  Council]  preferred
heroically, to abandon to their fate [in Angola and Mozambique] millions and millions of
people who, in the meantime, died in one of the most terrifying catastrophes in the history of
mankind and whose responsibility is all theirs” (Moura, 1994).
Moreover, the start of this “rebellion of memory” also coincided with the beginning of
a new political cycle marked by the coming to power of the Socialist Party. For the first time,
on its 25th anniversary, the April Revolution was celebrated with enthusiasm by the political
establishment. At this point, a stimulus was provided for the publication of autobiographical
accounts and memoirs by some  of the protagonists of the resistance to the dictatorship. In
their old age, they became aware of the need to fix the autobiographical narrative, since they
saw themselves confronted with the proliferation of revisionist discourses, which denied the
repressive past. Among these publications are the ones cited above which were authored by
pre-revolution militants.  As it  is  possible to see by the number of  publications,  LUAR’s
militants were the most concerned about telling their stories. This might be due to the fact
that the LUAR was an organisation with very specific characteristics,  distanced from the
more traditional forms of party logic and structure. For instance, its one and only ideological
stance was being anti-fascist. In addition, it was the only organisation that did not commit
bomb attacks and which always kept its operational base outside the country, both in Paris
and  Brussels.  However,  despite  being  strongly  committed  to  telling  the  story  of  the
organisation until the April Revolution, LUAR’s militants did not cover its story during the
Ongoing Revolutionary Process. This was a period of time in which the LUAR developed a
remarkable work in conjunction with other social movements (Ferreira, 2015a). Thus, the
LUAR’s story after the April Revolution still needs to be told. As for the ARA, the PCP's
strategy during the period of historical revisionism was to avoid talking about issues that
could raise controversy and incite criticism by the right to the role of the Communist Party in
the history of anti-fascism and the April Revolution. Moreover, it was not until the end of the
1990s when the concept that devalued individual militancy experiences to the detriment of
collective effort began to be reconfigured, which ultimately led to a silencing of the memorial
discourse of many resistance militants (Nogueira 2009). Regarding the BR, there is only one
very  recent  half  memorialist,  half  academic  piece.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  intense
revolutionary  activity  developed  by  the  Revolutionary  Party  of  the  Proletariat  (PRP),  to
which the BR was coupled, in the period after the April Revolution. Despite the suspension
of armed struggle right after the April Revolution, the BR were reactivated and re-established
in August 1975, returning to the commission of armed activities, such as bank robberies, in
order to finance the organisation. Such activities led to the imprisonment of BR’s co-founders
and leaders Carlos Antunes and Isabel do Carmo, in June 1978.
The  right-wing  return  to  power  in  2002  influenced  the celebrations  of  the  30th
anniversary of the April Revolution since again such governmental elite was bothered by the
revolutionary  legacy.  The  slogan  of  these  celebrations  –  April  is  Evolution –  instead  of
Revolution, provoked a strong reaction in the media and in the public space. The right-wing
strategy of imparting an evolutionary character to the April Revolution, in tune with the idea
of transition, was completely torn by the political reaction in defence of the April Revolution
as a specifically Portuguese model of building democracy (Loff 2015). Such a socio-political
context  was  favourable  to  the  dismantling  of  the  establishment’s  discourse  since  the
government was quite unpopular. This could be seen by the heavy defeat suffered by the
right-wing  two  months  later  in  the  European  elections  of  that  year,  as  well  as,  in  the
following  year,  2005,  the  fact  that  the  right-wing  experienced  the  worst  result  in  the
legislative elections of the last 30 years.
During the difficult years of the recent economic crisis (2011-2015), which mainly
affected the middle and low classes, at a time of lack of hope, there was a memory recovery
regarding the more radical forms of struggle. In the face of the apparent ineffectiveness of
peaceful demonstrations, the deaf ears of politicians, the discourse of inevitability, and the
sense of powerlessness to change the circumstances, there was once again a political narrative
linked to  the possible  need for  a  violent  response to  reverse the situation.  However,  the
recalled violence focused mainly on the pre-revolution period, in which the struggle against
the dictatorship and the Colonial War, and the fact that blood crimes were not committed,
seem  to  justify  a  certain  kindness  towards  political  violence.  In  this  sense,  the  armed
activities committed in the whole period of the counter- and post-revolution ended up falling
into  oblivion.  The  country  went  through  a  democratisation  process  and  the  existence  of
political violence in democracy became the unspoken facet of the armed struggle history in
Portugal.
In  this  context,  there  is  a  clear  gap  in  the  scholarly  knowledge  regarding  the
Portuguese  armed  struggle,  except  for  Miguel  Cardina's  work  on  Maoism  in  Portugal
between  1964  and  1974  (Cardina,  2010),  Ana  Sofia  Ferreira’s  on  armed  struggle
organisations during the dictatorship (Ferreira, 2015a) and Raquel da Silva’s on the narratives
of political violence in Portugal both before and after the April Revolution (Da Silva, 2016).
Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to explore the reasons behind the low number of both lay and
academic publications regarding the Portuguese history of armed struggle, both before and
after the 25 April 1974 Revolution. We argued that the main reasons are the whitewashing of
Estado  Novo’s  regime  and the  consequent  historical  revisionism which  took  root  in  the
country in the late 1970s and throughout the1980s. In this sense, we demonstrated how part
of  the  Portuguese  historical  identity  has  been  manipulated  by  political  and  ideological
interests  and  motivations,  which  influence  the  collective  memory.  However,  we  also
demonstrated how memory has become, from the 1990’s onwards, a culturally and politically
intense battle field in Portugal, in which the different sides have made efforts to tell their
stories  and  to  influence  the  nation’s  political  narratives,  as  well  as  what  should  be
remembered and what should be forgotten.
Nonetheless,  Portuguese  public  opinion  at  present  is  still  fairly  influenced  by
revisionist  perspectives.  Consequently,  the  stories  of  those  individuals  who  invested  a
significant  part  of  their  lives  fighting  violently  for  their  political  ideals  have  still  been
predominantly ignored and erased from the collective memory. There is, for instance, a clear
lack of acknowledgement of their existence (and of political armed struggle in general) in the
history books and school  curriculums in  Portugal.  This  is  something that  the  Portuguese
historian Rui Bebiano (2006b, p.9) calls “unmemory” rather than “forgetfulness”, because
while  the  latter  involves  “carelessness,  accident,  casual  blur  of  past  reminiscences”,  the
former involves “a voluntary erasure of memory, a lack of knowledge or even a lack of
interest in certain areas of living, considered irrelevant and not instrumental”.
Therefore, it is the responsibility of researchers in the social and human sciences to
rescue the study of political violence in Portugal and to bring it to the collective memory
arena.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest: Author A declares that she has no conflict of interest. Author B declares
that she has no conflict of interest.
Ethical approval: This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals
performed by any of the authors.
Bibliography
Amaro, R. (1982). O salazarismo na lógica do capitalism em Portugal. Análise Social, VXIII
(72-73-74), 995–1011.
Antunes, C. (1974). Dossier Brigadas Revolucionárias. Lisboa: Edições Revolução.
Bebiano, R. (2006a) Contestação do regime e tentação da luta armada sob o marcelismo.
Revista Portuguesa de História, 37, 65–104.
Bebiano, R. (2006b). Da desmemória e do seu antídoto. In M. Cruzeiro & R. Bebiano (Eds.),
Anos  inquietos:  vozes  do  movimento  estudantil  em  Coimbra  (1961-1974) (9-13).  Porto:
Edições Afrontamento.
Braga, I. (1994). História Contemporânea fechada a sete chaves. Público.
Cruzeiro,  M.  & Bebiano,  R.  (2006).  Anos  inquietos:  vozes  do  movimento  estudantil  em
Coimbra (1961-1974). Porto: Edições Afrontamento.
Cabrera, A. (2014). A memória e o esquecimento: a censura do Estado Novo em Portugal
perante três peças de autores espanhóis  [online]. Revista Eletrónica de Teoria da Literatura
e Literatura Comparada, 10, 89–110. Retrieved from:
http://www.452f.com/pdf/numero10/10_452f-mono-ana-cabrera-orgnl.pdf  [Accessed 7 April
2013]
Calvão, A. (1976). De Conakry ao MDLP: dossier secreto. Lisboa: Editorial Presença.
Camacho, J.  (2011).  Terrorismo em Portugal,  a guerra esquecida. Edição de autor:  RCP
edições.
Cardina,  M. (2010).  Política  ,  Punição e  Silenciamento nas oposições  radicais  ao Estado
Novo.  O  Cabo  dos  Trabalhos:  Revista  Electrónica  dos  Programas  de  Mestrado  e
Doutoramento  do  CES/  FEUC/  FLUC,  4:  1-16.
http://cabodostrabalhos/ces.uc.pt/n4/ensaios.php. Accessed 5 May 2013.
Cardina,  M.  (2011).  Margem de  Certa  Maneira:  O Maoismo em Portugal  (1964-1974).
Lisboa, Tinta-da-China.
Carvalho, M. (2017). Quando Portugal ardeu : Histórias e segredos da violência política no
pós-25 de Abril. Alfragide: Oficina do Livro.
Cerezales, D. P. (2003a). Um caso de violência política : o «Verão quente».  Análise Social,
XXXVII(165), 1127–1157.
Cerqueira,  A.  (2015).  Revolução  e  contra-revolução  em  Portugal  (1974-1975).  Lisboa:
Parsifal.
Collotti, E. (1989). Fascismo, fascismi. Firenze: Sansoni.
Costa, J. M.  (2004). O terrorismo e as FP 25 anos depois. Lisboa: Edições Colibri.
Cruzeiro, M. M. (2011) Revolução e revisionismo historiográfico. O 25 de Abril visto da
história. In R. C. Martins (Ed.),  Portugal 1974. Transição política em perspectiva histórica
(pp. 126-131). Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra.
Dâmaso, E. (1997). A invasão Spinolista. Lisboa: Fenda.
Dugos, C. (1976). M.D.L.P. – E.L.P. – O que são? Lisboa: Edições Acrópole, Lda.
Ferreira,  A.  S.  (2015a).  Luta  armada  em  Portugal  (1970-1974)  (Doctoral dissertation,
Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Univeridade Nova de Lisboa). Retrieved from
https://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/16326
Ferreira, A. S. (2015b).  Memória da luta armada durante os 40 anos de democracia. In M.
Loff, F. Piedade & L.  Soutelo (Eds.),  Ditaduras e Revolução. Democracia e políticas da
memória (pp. 233-245). Coimbra: edições Almedina.
Hastings, A. (1973). Wiriyamu. London: Search Press.
Hortelão, R., Baêna, L. & Sousa, A. (2012). Alpoim Calvão: honra e dever. Porto: Caminhos
Romanos.
Leitão, F. & Pina, C. (1975). LUAR: o que é? Lisboa: Agência Portuguesa de Revistas.
Lindim, I. (2012).  Mulheres de armas: história das Brigadas Revolucionárias - as acções
armadas, os riscos, as motivações. Carnaxide: Editora Objectiva.
Loff, M. (2000). Esquecimento, revisão da História e revolta da memória. In I. Delgado, M.
Loff,  A.  Clunny,  C.  Pacheco  &  R.  Monteiro  (Eds.), De  Pinochet  a  Timor  Loro  Sae.
Impunidade e direirto à memória. (pp. 189-1999). Lisboa: Edições Cosmos.
Loff, M. (2006). Fim do colonialismo, ruptura política e transformação social em Portugal
nos assos setenta. In M. Loff & M. Pereira (Eds.), Portugal, 30 anos de democracia (1974-
2004). Porto: Editora da UP.
Loff,  M.  (2014).  Dictatorship  and revolution:  socio-political  reconstructions  of  collective
memory in post-authoritarian Portugal. Culture & History Digital Journal, 3(2), 1-13.
Loff, M. (2015). Estado, democracia e memória: políticas públicas da memória da ditadura
portuguesa (1974-2014). In M. Loff, F. Piedade & L. Soutelo (Eds.), Ditaduras e Revolução.
Democracia e políticas da memória (pp. 123-143). Coimbra: edições Almedina.
Macedo, J .C. (1985). As cinzas dum tempo perdido. A ascensão e queda das FP 25?. Mem
Martins: publicações Europa-América.
Madeira, J. (2013). História do PCP. Das origens ao 25 de Abril (1921-1974). Lisboa: Tinta
da China.
Marchi, R. (2012). A extrema-direita portuguesa na “Rua”: da transição à democracia (1976-
1980). Locus, Revista de História, 18 (1), 167-186.
Marques, F. P.  (1976).  Criar poder popular: reflexões e documentos dum ex-militante da
LUAR sobre um partido e uma prática. Lisboa: Edições Ulmeiro.
Marques, F. P. (2016). Uma nova concepção de luta. Lisboa: Tinta da China.
Martins, J. & Loureiro, R. (1980). As organizações armadas em Portugal de 1967 a 1974.
História, 18, 14–26.
Mattoso, J. (1994). História de Portugal. O Estado Novo (1926-1974). Lisboa: Editorial
Estampa.
Miguel, F. (1977). Uma vida na Revolução. Porto: A Opinião.
Mortágua, C. (2013).  Andanças para a liberdade. Volume II: 1961-1974. Lisboa: Esfera do
Caos.
Moura, V. G. (1994). Portugal e o passado. Diário de Notícias.
Narciso, R. (2000). ARA: Acção Revolucionária Armada: a história secreta do braço armado
do PCP. Lisboa: D. Quixote.
Nogueira, C.A.M. (2009). De militantes a clandestinos: práticas e processos de formação na
clandestinidade comunista (1940/1974) (Doctoral Dissertation, Faculdade de Psicologia e de
Ciências da Educação). Retrieved from https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/99516
Oliveira, C. (1990). A evolução política. In A. Oliveira Marques & J. Serrão (Eds.). Nova
história de Portugal. Volume XII. Portugal e o Estado Novo (1930-1960). Lisboa: Editorial
Presença.
Pimentel, I. (2007). A historia da PIDE. Rio de Mouro: Circulo de Leitores
Pimentel, I. (2011). A polícia política do Estado Novo Português – PIDE/DGS: história,
justiça e memória, Acervo, 24 (1), 139–156.
Pimentel,  I.  (2014).  História  da  oposição  à  ditadura  Portugesa:  1926-1974.  Porto:
Figueirinhas.
Pinto, D. (2010).  Ensaio sobre a evolução política do Estado Novo.  (Master dissertation,
Universidade Fernando Pessoa). Retrieved from http://bdigital.ufp.pt/handle/10284/1945
Poggio, P. P. (2006). Nazismo y revisionismo histórico. Madrid: Akal.
Raby, D. (1988). A resistência antifascista em Portugal: comunistas, democratas e militares
em oposição a Salazar, 1941-1974. Lisboa: Editora Salamandra.
Rezola, M. (2007). 25 de Abril: mitos de uma revolução. Lisboa: Esfera dos Livros.
Rocha, R. (1990). Os melindrosos arquivos da PIDE. Expresso.
Rosas, F. (2001) O salazarismo e o homem novo: Ensaio sobre o Estado Novo e a questão do
totalitarismo, Análise Social, 35(157), 1031–1054.
Rosas, F. (2004). Notas para um debate: a revolução e a democracia. In F. Rosas & F. Louçã
(Eds.), Ensaio geral: Passado e futuro do 25 de Abril. Lisboa: D. Quixote.
Rosas, F. (2016). História e Memória – “última lição” de Fernando Rosas. Lisboa: Tinta-da-
China
Rosas, F. & Brito, J. (1996). Dicionário de história do Estado Novo. Vendas Nova: Bertrand
Editora.
Santos, J. H. (2011). Felizmente Houve a LUAR: Para a História da Luta Armada Contra a
Ditadura. Lisboa: Âncora.
Serra, J. (1999).  As explosões que abalaram o fascismo: o que foi a ARA. Lisboa: Edições
Avante!
Serrão,  J.,  Barreto, A.  &  Mónica,  M.  F.  (1999).  Dicionário  da  história  de  Portugal.
Suplemento 9. Porto: Livraria Figueirinhas.
Silva, A. C. (1987). “O fortalecimento das relações económicas externas”, speech “No jantar
da Câmara de Comércio Hispano-portuguesa”. In Cumprir a esperança. Discursos proferidos
durante a vigência do X Governo Consttucional (p. 386). Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da
Moeda.
Da Silva,  R.  (2016).  Giving  Them a  Voice:  Narratives  of  Political  Violence  in  Portugal
(Doctoral  dissertation,  University  of  Birmingham).  Retrieved  from
http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/7023/
Soares, M. (1994). A superioridade moral da democracia. Público.
Sousa, M. R. (1992). Guerrilha no asfalto. As FP-25 e o tempo português. Coimbra: Fora do
Texto.
Soutelo,  L.  (2015a).  A  memória  pública  do  passado  recente  nas  sociedades  ibéricas:
Revisionismo  histórico  e  combates  pela  memória  em  finais  do  século  XX (Doctoral
dissertation, Faculdade de Letras, Universidade do Porto). Retrieved from https://repositorio-
aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/83844
Soutelo, L. (2015b). O revisionismo histórico em perspectiva camparad: Os casos de Portugal
e Espanha. In M. Loff, F. Piedade & L. Soutelo (Eds.), Ditaduras e Revolução. Democracia e
políticas da memória (pp. 263-287). Coimbra: edições Almedina.
Spínola, A. (1974). Portugal e o futuro. 2nd Edition. Lisboa: Arcádia.
Viegas, T. (1996). As Brigadas Revolucionárias: A Resistência Armada à Ditadura (1970-
1974). História (Nova Série).
Vilela, A. J. (2005). Viver e Morrer em Nome das FP-25. Lisboa: Casa das Letras.
Wallraff,  G. (1976).  A descoberta de uma conspiração: a acção Spinola.Lisboa: Livraria
Bertrand.
